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THE 1982 NEW YORK LEGAL AID STRIKE:
ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS UNDER THE
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
I.

INTRODUCTION

The recent trend of unionization among attorneys employed in
virtually every facet of practice' has stimulated much comment
within the legal profession. Although collective bargaining units of
attorneys have been recognized by the National Labor Relations
Board 2 ("the Board"), prominent members of the profession have expressed resistance to the idea that attorneys should be permitted to
join unions. 3 The attorney's ethical duty under the American Bar
1. Flaherty, Attorneys, Look for the Union Label, Nat'l L.J., Aug. 15, 1983, at 1, col. 3.
Since the inception of the first lawyer union 14 years ago, membership in similar organizations
has comprised lawyers from all segments of the profession, "from prosecutors and law firm
associates to public interest lawyers and bar association attorneys . . . [l]aw professors [and]
lawyers who work for legal publishers . . . are also joining unions . . . ." Id. at 1, col. 4, 28,
col. 1. One element that has traditionally resisted unionization is the private law firm associate. One union official reported that while "well-paid but overworked younger associate attorneys" frequently contact him to express an interest in improving their working conditions, they
"have a terrific amount of fear" that they will be dismissed and often decide "not to take a
chance on a union." Id. at 28, col. 1. Lewis, The Unionization of Law Firms and How To
Avoid It, 16 ARIZ. B.J. 14 (1980). Lewis observes that the prospect of unionization by attorneys in the private, traditional law firm "is not outside the realm of possibility, particularly
where a firm employs a sizable group of disappointed associates who failed to achieve partnership status or who are disgruntled for other reasons." Id. at 17.
2. See infra text accompanying notes 23-34. See generally J. FEERICK, H. BAER & J.
ARFA, NLRB REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS-LAW PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, § 8.16.2 (1979-80)
(reviewing the Board's exercise of jurisdiction over private law firms).
3. "There is still a strong belief. . . that as professionals lawyers do not belong in unions". Flaherty, supra note 1, at 31, col. 3 (quoting a senior trial counsel of the State Bar of
California). See also Lewis, supra note 1, at 20. See Middleton, Antitrust Law v. Lawyers,
Nat'l L.J., Feb. 25, 1985, at 13, col. 1. Sylvester, Indigent Defense in Crisis, Nat'l L.J., Sept.
26, 1983, at 11, col. I (reporting that representatives of "the Federal Trade Commission...
targeted the strike [by defense lawyers for the indigent in Washington, D.C. in September
1983] . . . for an investigation to determine whether meetings by striking lawyers amount[ed]
to collusion to fix prices and violate federal antitrust laws"). Pollock, Unionizing Lawyers
Fight Outside Counsel, 2 AM. LAW. 11 (1980). Depicting problems encountered by unionized
attorney/employees of the federally funded Legal Service Corporation (LSC), the author
wrote, "All over the country, the unions are charging that management is hiring outside counsel to bust unions."
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Association ("ABA") Code of Professional Responsibility 4 ("the

Code") has been cited to restrain unionized attorneys from engaging
in concerted job actions.5 The potential tension (between the Code
and an attorney-employee's right to strike) merits close scrutiny.
Discontent among public defenders, staff lawyers of legal service organizations, and private lawyers who defend indigent clients has increasingly resulted in the use of lawsuits and strikes to gain better
pay and to obtain relief from unmanageable caseloads.6 The threat
of disciplinary action is a potent obstacle to the use of a strike action
to back up demands made during collective bargaining. 7
A case in point involved the staff attorneys of the New York
Legal Aid Society" ("the Society"). In 1982 they staged a ten week
strike to protest low salaries and heavy caseloads. 9 In response, the
4.

MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1980) [hereinafter cited as MODEL

CODE].

5. Samad, Unionization of Law Offices: Some Ethical Concerns, 55 OHIO ST. B.A. REP.
1314 (1982) (ABA Informal Opinion 936 defined as unethical such actions as strikes, boycotts, and withholding of services, including refusing to cross a picket line.); Flaherty, supra
note 1, at 31, col. 4 ("Perhaps the most serious basis for the ambivalence over lawyer unions is
the strong suspicion that a lawyer's duties as a union member may collide with his duties to his
clients. That concern is codified in the American Bar Association's Code of Professional Responsibility ....");Comment, NLRB Asserts JurisdictionOver Law Firms: Has the Door
Been Opened to Lawyer Unionization?, 27 BUFFALO L. REV. 361, 371 (1978) ("A further
impediment to lawyer unionization is the possibility that such activity might be forbidden by
the American Bar Association's Code of Professional Responsibility. Although ABA standards
do not affect the Board's power to assert jurisdiction, they could nonetheless effectively deter
lawyers from unionizing.").
6. Sylvester, supra note 3. Discussing a work stoppage by non-salaried, private, courtappointed indigent defense lawyers in Washington, D.C. in September 1983 which was premised on the issue of inadequate pay, the author wrote, "throughout the country, public defenders and private lawyers who accept the burden of defending poor people are up in arms
about low pay and a crushing case load." Id. at 1, col. 1.
7. Pollock, supra note 3, at 11. In "New York, [Community Action for Legal Services']
CALS general counsel, Catherine Mitchell, wrote a not-so-polite memo, obviously directed at
preoccupied unionizers, reminding them that CALS would report any violations of the Professional Code of Responsibility [sic] to the Appellate Division."
8. Shipp, New York ConsidersReplacing Legal Aid Society, N.Y. Times, Dec. 7, 1982,
at B2, col. 1. The Society, a private, non-profit organization, founded in 1876, contracts for a
fixed fee with the City of New York to provide legal defense services to criminally charged
indigent clients. Since July 1966, the Society has been designated as the primary provider of
criminal defense for the indigent. Private lawyers are used by the City as a backup. In 1981,
private lawyers were assigned 24,000 cases, and the Society was assigned 154,500.
9. The Strike was approved by a majority vote of the union on October 22, 1982, and
continued until a settlement was reached on January 3, 1983. See generally Union Panel Advises Legal Aid Strikers to Accept Tentative Pact, N.Y. Times Dec. 30, 1982, at B1, col. 1;
Strike by City Legal Aid Lawyers Having Little Effect Yet on Courts, N.Y. Times, Oct. 26,
1982, at B3, col. 1; Dispute Over a Dismissal Causes Legal Aid Strike, N.Y. Times, Oct. 23,
1982, at A29, col. 5.
At the time the strike commenced, a two-year contract which was set to expire on
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Committee on Professional and Judicial Ethics of the Association of

the Bar of the City of New York ("the Committee") issued Ethical
Opinion 82-75,10 commenting on the ethical implications of a hypo-

thetical strike. Ethical Opinion 82-75 reinforces the misconception
held by many that under the Code strike activity by lawyers is

unethical.
This Note examines Ethical Opinion 82-75's analysis of the Society staff attorneys' obligations under the Code when faced with a

decision whether or not to engage in a strike against their employer.
A prospective look is taken at whether a strike by legal aid lawyer-

employees would be ethical under the recently proposed ABA Model
Rules of Professional Conduct1 1 ("the Model Rules"). Under the

Code and Model Rules, it was professionally responsible for Society
staff attorneys to strike to improve the quality of client representation. It is the duty of an attorney to improve the judicial system. 12

The objective of the October 1982 strike was to protest overly burdensome caseloads, which undermined competent representation, and
to draw attention to the low pay, a factor in the high turnover in
experienced litigators. Resorting to a ten-week strike to redress these

grievances and to achieve salutory legal reform was justified when
June 30, 1983 was in effect between the Society and the union. Contained in the contract was
a provision that permitted renegotiation over wages and benefits. Negotiations were under way
and on October 12, 1982, the Society submitted a proposal that contained 13 wage steps,
ranging from an entry level salary of $21,500 to one of $42,000 for lawyers who had been with
the Society for at least 13 years. At that time, actual salaries ranged from $21,000 for a
newly-hired lawyer who had passed the New York bar to $39,500 at the top level.
On October 13th, Welden Brewer, a Society staff attorney with 10 years experience, was
dismissed from the Brooklyn office. Mr. Brewer's dismissal served as a catalyst for expression
of discontent over what the union considered to be excessive caseloads. Archibald R. Murray,
Executive Director of the Society, said Mr. Brewer was fired for mishandling two "very serious
cases" in September, 1982. The union responded by charging that he was fired because he had
complained that his caseload was so heavy that it prevented him from effectively representing
his clients. As a compromise, the Society offered to restore Mr. Brewer to the payroll but to
suspend him pending a decision on his case by the American Arbitration Association. The
union viewed the offer as "far from satisfactory." A strike was approved by the union on
October 23, 1982, after failing to reach agreement on the Society's last wage offer and on the
dispute involving the firing of the senior lawyer from the Brooklyn office. The focus of the
union dissatisfaction had shifted from purely economic issues. Caseload size became part of
the bargaining. Ms. Carol Gerstl, President of the Association of Legal Aid Attorneys, said of
Mr. Brewer's dismissal that it "was the spark that galvanized the anger of the lawyers, coming
the day after the final wage offer." N.Y. Times, Nov. 7, 1982, at § 1, at 38, col. 4.
10. N.Y. City Bar Ass'n Comm. on Professional and Judicial Ethics, Op. 82-75, in
OPINIONS COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS

(E. Wypyski ed.) [hereinafter cited as Ethi-

cal Opinion 82-75].

11.

MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

(1983). The Model Rules are repro-

duced at 52 U.S.L.W. I Statutes (1983) [hereinafter cited as MODEL RULES].
12. Id. Canon 8.
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less extreme measures proved unsuccessful.
II.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT 13 JURISDICTION OVER THE
LEGAL PROFESSION

Attorney-employees who unionize are protected by their right of
freedom of association under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.14 The right to associate with a labor union is of dubious value
without the protections codified in Section 7 of the Act. 15 Congress
empowered the Board with jurisdiction to "the fullest jurisdictional
breadth constitutionally permissible under the Commerce Clause."1 6
From its beginning, the Board has limited the exercise of its jurisdiction to cases having a "substantial impact" on interstate commerce.17 Prior to 1977, the Board excluded law firms from coverage

18
under the Act.

Coverage has traditionally been granted to certain attorneys in
13. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-88 (1982). The National Labor Relations Act ("the Act") is comprised of three primary statutes: the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 (Wagner Act), ch.
372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947 (Taft-Hartley Act),
ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (1947), and the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of
1959 (Landrum-Griffin Act), Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519 (1959).
14. Comment, Unionizationof Law Firm Associates?, 32 Sw. LJ. 987, 991 (1978). See
Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 532 (1945) "Such regulation [of labor unions with a view to
protecting the public interest] ... whether aimed at fraud or other abuses, must not trespass
upon the domains set apart for free speech and free assembly." Connecticut State Fcd'n of
Teachers v. Board of Educ. Members, 538 F.2d 471, 478 (2d Cir. 1976). "Nor can it be
questioned that the First Amendment's protection of speech and associational rights extends to
labor union activities."
15. Note, The Unionization of Attorneys, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 100, 102-03 (1971). "Employees who fall outside the Act's protection are in a position analogous to that of labor union
members prior to enactment of the Act in 1935; while such employees are free to organize, the
conduct of management . . . is subject to none of the Act's sanctions against unfair labor
practices." (footnotes omitted).
16. NLRB v. Reliance Fuel Oil Corp., 371 U.S. 224, 226 (1963) (emphasis in original).
17. Comment, supra note 5, at 361 n.7. From its inception the Board declined jurisdiction over cases it deemed essentially local in character. The Board had discretionary authority
to decline jurisdiction over any industry for which no jurisdictional yardstick existed on August 1, 1959, provided the effect of a labor dispute on commerce is insubstantial. 29 U.S.C.
§ 164(c)(1) (1976). See generally A. Cox, D. BOK & R. GORMAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
LABOR LAW, 88-90 (9th Ed. 1977). For example, the Board will decline to exercise jurisdiction
over retail concerns with less than $500,000.00 in gross yearly sales.
18. Bodle, Fogel, Julber, Reinhardt & Rothschild, 206 N.L.R.B. 512, 84 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 1321 (1973). (The Board declined to characterize the practice of law as a commercial
activity, found its connection with the flow of commerce "incidental," and ruled that labor
disputes at law firms did not have a significant enough impact on interstate commerce to warrant coverage under the Act.) See Evans & Kunz, Ltd., 194 N.L.R.B. 1216, 79 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 1181 (1972). (The first case before the Board where it was asked to decide whether it
should exercise jurisdiction over a law firm. The Board declined, ruling that the firm's impact
upon commerce was insufficient to warrant the exercise of its jurisdiction.)
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their capacity as employees.19 Pertinent legislative history reveals
that when Congress defined "professional employees" 2 0 in the Act, it

anticipated that coverage would extend to attorneys.21 In addition to
referring to legislative history, the Board has appliedthe "right of
control test"2 2 to find an employee-employer relationship where at-

torneys are subject to the control and direction of an employer in the
course of their work. In directing an election of a unit comprised
solely of lawyers from an in-house legal department in Lumberman's
Mutual Casualty Co., 23 the Board distinguished between attorneys

of a corporation who received a regular salary and attorneys employed by private law firms. 24 In that case, the Board determined

that the attorneys could unionize and bargain collectively with their
employer because the employee/employer relationship existed.25
Those attorneys were paid a salary, worked regular hours, accrued

vacation time, and had their activities supervised by their employer. 26 Society staff attorneys work under an arrangement strik-

ingly similar to that in Lumberman and distinct from the traditional
private firm practice model. Under the legislative history and "right
19. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1982) states in pertinent part: "The term 'employee' shall include any employee . . .but shall not include . . . any individual having the status of an
independent contractor, or any individual employed as a supervisor, or any individual employed . . . by any other person who is not an employer as -herein defined."
20. Professional employees include "any employee engaged in work (i) predominantly
intellectual . . .(ii) involving the consistent exercise of discretion and judgment in its performance." 29 U.S.C. § 152 (12) (1982).
21. S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1947), reprinted in 1 NLRB LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AcT OF 1947, at 417 (1974). The
report of the Senate Committee on Labor & Public Welfare stated that
[a]lthough there has been a trend in recent years for manufacturing corporations to
employ many professional persons, including . . . lawyers . . . no corresponding
recognition was given by Congress to their special problems . . . .Under the committee bill, the Board is required to afford such groups an opportunity to vote in a
separate unit to ascertain whether or not they wish to have a bargaining representative of their own.
H. R. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., Ist Sess. 36 (1947) reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT OF

1947,

at

540 (1974). The

Commit-

tee referred to the definition of professional employees and stated that "[t]his definition in,
general covers such persons as legal . . . personnel ...."
22. Deaton Truck Line, Inc. v. NLRB, 337 F.2d 697, 698 (5th Cir. 1964). "Under this
test, an employer-employee relationship exists where the person for whom the services are
performed reserves the right to control not only the end to be achieved, but also the means to
be used in reaching such end." (quoting Deaton Truck Lines, Inc., 143 N.L.R.B. 1372, 1377,
53 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1497, 1499 (1963)).
23. 75 N.L.R.B. 1132, 21 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1107 (1948).
24. Id. at 1134-35, 21 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1108.
25. Comment, supra note 14, at 992.
26. Lumberman's Mutual Casualty Co., 75 N.L.R.B. at 1134-35, 21 L.R.R.M. (BNA)
at 1108.
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to control" analysis, the Society staff attorneys' union activity is protected under the Act.
In the 1977 case of Foley, Hoag and Eliot,2 7 the Board reevaluated its prior decision to exclude law firms from coverage under the
Act and asserted jurisdiction, subject only to a requirement that
firms satisfy a monetary standard.28 Immediately prior to the Foley
decision, the United States Supreme Court in Goldfarb v. Virginia
State Bar2" held the practice of law to comprise "trade or commerce."80 The Board then concluded in Foley that Congress intended to exercise fully the same extensive commerce power under
the Act that it had exercised in regulating commerce.31 Thus, the
practice of law was "commerce" within the meaning of Sections
2(6) 82 and 2(7)33 of the Act. In Foley, the Board determined that
file clerks and messengers who worked for a private law firm had a
34
right to petition the Board for unionization.
Since its decision in Foley, the Board has reported two cases
involving the unionization of attorneys who work for non-profit legal
service corporations.3 5 In Wayne County Legal Services, Inc.,3" the
Board asserted jurisdiction over a non-profit law clinic that provided
legal services to poor clients who lived in Michigan. A minimum "affecting commerce" standard of $250,000.00 in gross annual fees was
established in Camden Regional Legal Services, Inc.3 7 Subsequently,
27.
28.
29.

229 N.L.R.B. 456, 95 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1041 (1977).
Id. at 457, 95 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1043.
421 U.S. 773 (1975).

30. Id. at 787-88. "Given the substantial volume of commerce involved, and the inseparability of this particular legal service [title examination] from the interstate aspects of real
estate transactions, we conclude that interstate commerce has been sufficiently affected." Id. at
785 (footnotes omitted). Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 120 (1942). Congress may regulate activities that have both an indirect as well as direct affect on interstate commerce. A
showing that the actual impact of the activities may affect interstate commerce is sufficient.
31. Foley, Hoag and Eliot 229 N.L.R.B. at 457, 95 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1043.

32. "The term 'commerce' means trade.
." 29
33.
free flow
34.

. .

or communication among the several States

U.S.C. § 152(6) (1976).
"The term 'affecting commerce' means in commerce . . . or obstructing .
of commerce." 29 U.S.C. § 152(7) (1976).
Foley, Hoag and Eliot 229 N.L.R.B. at 457, 95 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1043.

. .

the

35. The Act's definition of employer states in pertinent part that "the term 'employer'
includes any person acting as an agent of an employer, directly or indirectly, but shall not
include the United States or any wholly owned Government Corporation." 29 U.S.C. § 152
(2) (1976). Therefore, lawyers who work for a city, county, or state attorney's office or for a
public defender's office are excluded from protection of the Act. Comment, supra note 5, at
370.
36. 229 N.L.R.B. 1023, 95 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1209 (1977). The Board authorized a unit
comprised of law graduates and practicing attorneys.
37. 231 N.L.R.B. 224, 95 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1545 (1977). The Board also noted that the
law firm has a close nexus with interstate commerce because it purchased goods and services in
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the monetary standard was relaxed in Clark and Hinojosa,3 8 where

that firm's projected gross revenue for the year was $160,000.00,
plus a projected $7,500.00 in annual direct and indirect purchases

from out-of-state suppliers. A legal service organization easily meets
the "affecting commerce" standard articulated in Camden or Clark,
thus entitling its staff attorney-employees to petition the Board for
recognition of a bargaining representative."
III.

THE

AMERICAN

BAR ASSOCIATION CODE OF PROFESSIONAL

RESPONSIBILITY
Does the Code bar attorney-employees from engaging in a strike
where the exercise of less drastic measures proves ineffective in ameliorating unsatisfactory conditions of employment which directly impinge on the quality of client representation?
The Code, promulgated by the ABA in 1969,40 replaced the
longstanding ABA Canons of Professional Ethics.41 The ABA successfully waged a campaign to have the Code adopted by the

states.42 By 1972, the Code had been adopted by court rule or unified bar resolution in nearly all states, usually with no more than
marginal changes.4 3 The New York State Bar Association adopted
the Code as its own code of ethics, effective January 1, 1970. 4' Close
scrutiny of the Code following its adoption has uncovered inconsistencies, omissions, and ambiguities in drafting which have precipiexcess of $50,000 from such national concerns as I.B.M., Xerox, West Publishing Company
and Bell Telephone Company. Id.
38. 247 N.L.R.B. 710, 103 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1205 (1980). The Board asserted jurisdiction because the alleged violation of the Act concerned interference with NLRB processes. The
Board held that the firm violated § 8(a)(4) of the Act by reneging on a promise to give severance pay when a discharged secretary threatened to file an unfair labor practice charge with
the NLRB.
39. For a discussion of union organization by private law firm associates, see generally,
Lewis, supra note 1, at 15-20; Comment, supra note 14 at 991-1003; Note, The Unionization
of Law Firms, 46 FORDHAM L. REv. 1008, 1020-27 (1978).
40. The Model Code "was adopted by the House of Delegates of the American Bar
Association on August 12, 1969 and was amended by the House of Delegates in February,
1970, February, 1974, February, 1975, August, 1976, August, 1977, August, 1978, February,
1979, February, 1980, and August, 1980." I NAT'L REP. LEGAL & PROFESSIONAL RESPONsiBILITY 4 [hereinafter cited as REPORTER].
41. The Canons of Professional Ethics were first promulgated by the ABA in 1908, subsequently amended, and by 1914, had been adopted as guiding principles by 30 of 44 State
Bar Associations with few, if any, changes. 39 ABA ANN. REp. 559-61 (1914).
42. 97 ABA ANN. REP. 268 (1972).
43. Id. at 268-72.

44. N.Y.

JUD. LAW

APP. CODE

OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

351 (McKinney

1975) [hereinafter cited as CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY].
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tated much criticism. 45
The Code is divided into three separate but closely interrelated
components: Canons, Ethical Considerations, and Disciplinary
Rules.46 Its Preliminary Statement indicates that a lawyer may be

penalized only for acts of conduct proscribed under the Disciplinary
Rules ("D.R.'s"). 47 Ethical Considerations ("E.C.'s") are goals toward which each attorney should aspire. Canons are norms that set
standards of professional conduct. 48 Disciplinary infractions, which
are not ranked according to their severity, are determined by the
character of the offenses and their particular circumstances.49 The
Code's framers understood that no such document could address
every question of ethical behavior a lawyer might encounter in practice. Where Code language does not explicitly state standards, the
attorney must exercise discretion in determining what behavior is appropriate.5 The Code makes no mention of the ethical responsibility
of an attorney-employee who is contemplating a strike.5 a
45. REPORTER, supra note 40, at 500.
[R]eliance on [the Code's] three-part format has created considerable confusion
about the nature and the effect of the rules that govern the practice of law . . .
[T]he ethical considerations blend, without distinction, law, explanation or interpretation of disciplinary rules, and aspiration .

. .

. How the lawyer is to know what

purpose or effect the language . . . will have has not been adequately explained.
Yet, we know the cases clearly show that he has only found that out after the fact
-

to his peril.

(quoting comments by Robert Kutak made during the American Bar Association House of
Delegates Meeting on the Proposed Model Code of Professional Responsibility).
46.

CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Preliminary Statement, supra note 44, at

355.
47. The D.R.'s comprise the basic minimum competence "below which no lawyer can
fall without being subject to disciplinary action." Id. at 355-56. "The Disciplinary Rules, unlike the Ethical Considerations, are mandatory in character." Id. at 355.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 356.
50. Id. at 356, n.4.
No general statement of the responsibilities of the legal profession can encompass
all the situations in which the lawyer may be placed. Each position held by him
makes its own peculiar demands. These demands the lawyer must clarify for himself
in the light of the particular role in which he serves.
(quoting ProfessionalResponsibility:Report of the Joint Conference, 44 A.B.A. J. 1159, 1218
(1958)).
51. Finman and Schneyer, The Role of Bar Association Ethics Opinions in Regulating
Lawyer Conduct. A Critique of the Work of the ABA Committee on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility, 29 U.C.LA. L. REV. 67, 76 n.40.
The late Charles Frankel argued that law practice involves problems of such ethical
complexity that their solution can only be suggested by rules and must be worked
out with close attention to the details of each problem .

. .

. On this view, rule

interpretation may well be a more critical state in the regulation of lawyers then
rule formulation.
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In October 1982, Society staff attorneys encountered a challenge which, in the absence of a specific Code provision prohibiting

or mandating a legal aid strike in their predicament required them
to analyze the facts at hand in light of the professional ideals ex-

pressed in the E.C.'s and the basic requirement of competency of
client representation contained in the D.R.'s. Thus, these attorneys

had only the spirit of the Code to guide them in deciding whether a
strike was the ethical action to take. Following a conscientious examination of the results of low pay and prohibitive caseloads on the

quality of client representation, these attorneys voted to strike. The
conclusion in Ethical Opinion 82-75 is faulty in communicating to
members of the Bar the impression that the Code prohibits a strike
like that initiated by Society staff attorneys in October 1982.
IV.

ANALYSIS OF ETHICAL OPINION

A.

82-75

The Opinion's Importance

In July 1983, Ethical Opinion 82-75 was released and addressed
the ethical obligations of criminal defense attorneys employed by the
Society when a strike action is approved. This opinion was requested
by the "Mayor of the City of New York" and "some Legal Aid
attorneys" 52 regarding the October 22, 1982 through January 3,
1983 strike by staff attorneys of the Society. 53 Ethical Opinion 82-75
is only advisory; no disciplinary action based on it resulted against
52. Ethical Opinion 82-75, supra note 10
To trigger an ethics opinion, a party must usually make an inquiry to the committee. Ethics committees . . . most[ly] limit their services to members of their bar
association or to lawyers living in the area from which the association draws its
members . . . .The modern ethics opinion is always interpretive: it purports to
evaluate conduct according to the prevailing rules of professional conduct.
Finman and Schneyer, supra note 51, at 70 n.4.
53. See generally Union Panel Advises Legal Aid Strikers to Accept Tentative Pact,
N.Y. Times, Dec. 30, 1982 at BI, col. 1. The strike was settled on December 30, 1982 when
union members, upon recommendation of the executive committee of the union, voted to accept a negotiated settlement. Lawyers returned to their jobs on January 3, 1983. A new contract was approved which provided for wage increases of 6% in the first year and 5.2% in the
second. Prior to the agreement, the Society had offered the lawyers a 5.3% increase in the first
year. The union had sought 9%. The agreement brought the salary range in the contracet's final
year to $19,500 for lawyers not yet admitted to the bar and $45,900 for those with 12 years
experience. At the time the strike was called, wages were $18,500 for neophytes and $39,500
for those with 12 years experience.
On the issue of caseload size, a group of arbitrators was selected to decide on caseload
disputes. Included in the settlement was an agreement by the Society to continue paying full
salary to the senior Brooklyn Society lawyer whose firing over the caseload issue precipitated
the strike until the merits of his discharge were decided by a labor arbitrator.
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any striking attorney. 54 The opinion may, however, serve as persuasive authority should a striking attorney be brought before a disciplinary committee. It is important to analyze the opinion because it will
serve as a guideline to future legal aid attorneys who may consider
striking, but who do not want to jeopardize their good standing in
the Bar. The Committee's opinion will have a chilling effect on staff
attorneys of the Society, should they contemplate a strike action in
the future.
Stanley A. Samad, 55 in an article discussing the unionization of
law offices in light of ethical considerations, has conceded that a lawful strike by attorney-employees might not be validly disciplined
under the Code.5 6 One may infer from Samad's statement that he
would consider a strike by attorneys to be inconsistent with the provisions of the Code. He concludes by expressing the hope that
"where accommodations between one's loyalty to the profession and
loyalty to the union's goals cannot be made, the attorney/employee
will opt to be guided by the Code."'5 7 A similar viewpoint is expressed in Ethical Opinion 82-75.58

B. A Lack of Specificity
The generalities and overly broad character of Ethical Opinion
82-75 substantially undermine its usefulness as an ethical guideline.
Though requested as a response to a specific strike, the report states
"we expressly disclaim comment on the propriety of [the 1982
strike] . . . the Committee has determined to express its views on
54. Telephone interview with Lizbeth Shalen of The Association of Legal Aid Attorneys
of the City of New York.

55.

Professor of Law and Former Dean (1959-1979), The University of Akron School of

Law.
56. See Samad, supra note 5, at 1317-18.
A case against the ABA's position can be made by asserting that (a) the peaceful

strike by a recognized bargaining unit is a protected activity under the NLRA; (b)
a strike is effective only when persons belonging to the unit act in concert; (c) the
services of lawyers in the short run are no more essential than . . . those of a public
utility; (d) state legislative (or judicial) restrictions or penalties on federally protected activity is subject to the challenge of federal preemption of the field to pro-

tect the federal privilege and; (e) entities that provide legal services may provide for
the contingency of a strike by providing essential services through alternative
sources.
57. Id. at 1318.
58. Flaherty, supra note 1, at 36. "[Ethical Opinion 82-75] while not holding that all
lawyer strikes are unethical - said that striking lawyers should get court permission to withhold
their services from clients who are in litigation and may not ethically ignore the 'impact' of a
strike on the criminal justice system."
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the general issues." 59 This conspicuous lack of reference to a specific
fact pattern detracts from a clear understanding of the opinion. The
absence of specificity makes it difficult to perceive exactly what actions are ethical and unethical under the Code.
Monroe H. Freedman 6a directed this same criticism 6 at Ethical
Opinion 645 of the New York County Lawyers' Association Committee on Professional Ethics 62 which addressed the ethical implications of a strike by Society staff attorneys in 1974. Ethical Opinion
645 carefully described the Society without specifically indicating
the nature or extent of the strike it was evaluating. Similarly, Ethical Opinion 82-75 does a disservice to the conscientious attorney who
considers strike action and consults the document for a better understanding of what ethical options are available.
The narrow ambit of ethical strikes recognized by Ethical Opinion 82-75 is too restrictive to make a strike effective. Careful adherence to the opinion by striking lawyers would render their actions of
little consequence. The opinion draws a sharp distinction between
two categories of strikes. One category is clearly unethical, while the
second category might be ethical, as viewed by the Committee.
The clearly unethical act is comprised of "strike activity in
which a Legal Aid lawyer declines to continue the representation of
a client for whom he or she has assumed professional responsibility
....

-3 Implicit in this type of strike would be an action in which

attorneys walked off the job, declining to represent clients whose
cases were at the trial or hearing stage. This category would also
include a strike by attorneys who refuse to continue to prepare cases
that would be going to trial or hearing at a future date.
The alternative strike action, which under Ethical Opinion 8275 would not necessarily violate the Code, is characterized by "the
59.

Ethical Opinion 82-75, supra note 10, at 1.

60. Monroe Freedman is Professor of Law and former Dean (1973-77), Hofstra University School of Law. Professor Freedman has authored LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY
SYSTEM (1975).
61.

Freedman, The Legal Aid Strike, N.Y.L.J., June 25, 1975, at 1, col. 1. "By choos-

ing to deal with a real problem in abstract terms and through a Delphic pronouncement, the
Committee has at best confused the issue. At worst, the Committee's opinion has provided the

basis for the general inference that the Legal Aid strike has been condemned as unethical
.
... Id. at 1, col. 2.
62. N.Y. County Lawyers Ass'n Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 645 (1975), reprinted in N.Y.L.J. June 9, 1975, at 3,
attorneys have the right to strike, they
the courts and the judicial system or
representation and a speedy trial." Id.

col. 3. That opinion concluded by noting that although
may not do so if it "disrupts the proper functioning of
deprives indigent defendants of their right to proper
at 3, col. 4.

63. Ethical Opinion 82-75, supra note 10, at 9-10.
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refusal by a striking legal aid lawyer to accept new case assignments
from supervisory personnel." 64 Such an attorney owes no duty of representation to an unassigned client if he has "compelling reasons" to
refuse additional cases. 5 These reasons "may include the nature of
the grievance, the existence or non-existence of alternative methods
of presenting or resolving the grievance, the extent of disruption
caused by the strike action and the response of other parts of the
system and other lawyers to the strike.""6
Even where this factual balance tips in the striking attorney's
favor, however, the resulting permissible strike would be ineffective.
Under Ethical Opinion 82-75's interpretation of the Code, lawyers
would be constrained to continue representing clients whose cases
were at the hearing or trial stage and to continue preparing cases
already assigned. Carrying the ethical strike action contemplated by
the Committee to its logical conclusion, little about it would resemble a concerted action. Some attorneys would be able to responsibly
complete preparation tasks, such as interviewing witnesses, processing bail applications, and conducting investigations sooner than other
attorneys, who would be unable to join their colleagues on the picket
line.
Consequently, at the outset of such a strike, there would be little discernible impact on the attorney's employer. Only after much
67
time passed would a backlog of unrepresented client cases develop.
At the same time, those attorneys who had completed preparation
work for pre-strike clients would find it unnecessary to be at the office regularly. The time spent away from work by each attorney
would be on a staggered schedule, not coordinated with other attorneys. Little collective impact would be felt until long after the strike
had begun. This strike would not upset the status quo and achieve a
review of grievances. As such, it is an unacceptable solution to the
dilemma of whether attorneys may ethically use their right to
strike."
64. Id. at 10.
65. Id. at 14.
66. Id.
67. Flaherty, N.Y. Lawyers Strike Shuts Some Courts, Nat'l L.J., Dec. 6, 1982, at 6,
col. 2-3. Reporting on the 1982 strike by Society staff attorneys as it reached its sixth week,

the boroughs of Brooklyn and Manhattan, 10 criminal courtrooms
Flaherty observed "[i]n
have closed because of the lack of lawyers. Throughout the city, many defendants are being

arraigned without lawyers, and city corrections department officials have appealed to the state
to help house the increasing numbers of persons awaiting trial." Id.
68.

Ruthizer, City Bar Opinion Misses Mark, N.Y.L.J., June 29, 1983, at 2, col. 5.

Ruthizer asserts that "[iun setting up its own 'somewhat artificial distinction' . . . the Committee has acknowledged a theoretical right [to strike] which can never be exercised."
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The Committee fails to acknowledge the middle ground for a
strike by staff attorneys of a legal aid organization. In this mid-point
scenario, trials and hearings in progress would be completed after
the strike was called, but other cases that had been assigned before
the strike, and were in the preparation stage, would not receive ongoing attention of the striking lawyers until the strike action was
concluded. This was the strategy employed by striking Society staff
attorneys in the fall of 1982.69 By declining to address this specific
set of facts, the Committee rendered a significantly less useful opinion than might have otherwise been the case. A careful analysis of
specific Code provisions indicates that the strike by Society staff attorneys in the fall 1982 was in fact justified under Disciplinary Rules
and encouraged by Ethical Considerations."0
V.

A.

CLIENT NEGLECT

Misapplicationof D.R. 6-101(A)(3)

Ethical Opinion 82-75 bases its view that attorneys may ethically strike only by refusing to accept new clients on potential client
neglect that might result. It is ironic, therefore, that the potential of
client neglect due to unmanageable caseloads was one major factor
that precipitated, and ultimately justified, the October 1982 strike.
Staff attorneys were concerned that client rights were being infringed because the attorneys were unable to adequately prepare
their cases. Ethical Opinion 82-75 cites D.R. 6-101(A)(3)7 1 and
states "[w]e believe that such a deliberate refusal to provide services
to such existing clients constitutes neglect of a legal matter entrusted
to an attorney ....
72 The Committee properly emphasizes adequacy of representation as a pivotal concept in the dilemma of the
Society staff attorneys' strike. 3 Upon closer examination, however, it
becomes clear that the Committee misapplied D.R. 6-101(A)(3).
The Rule requires diligence in representing a client while a fiduciary duty exists. The type of neglect the provision contemplates is
different from a situation where a staff attorney for a legal aid organization declines to work on assigned cases due to a strike about
69. See Flaherty, N.Y. Legal Aid Lawyers Strike; DisruptionSeen, Nat' L.J., Nov. 8,
1982, at 2, col. 3.
70. C. Gersti, Association of Legal Aid Attorneys of the City of New York Response to
the Keenan Commission's Report (undated) (unpublished letter).
71. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 6-101 (A) (3), supra note 44, at 465.
"A lawyer shall not ... [n]eglect a legal matter entrusted to him." Id.
72. Ethical Opinion 82-75, supra note 10, at 10.
73. Id.
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which the client, employer, and court system have notice. Rather, as

one could infer from the provision's position in the Code's Index
under "Negligence of lawyer," 4 D.R. 6-101(A)(3) applies where the
attorney fails to act while the client believes his interests are being

attended.75 Society staff attorneys have a unique responsibility to ensure competent representation of their indigent clients. 76 A strike

designed to maintain legal services at a minimum professionally acceptable level for present and future clients is not properly barred
under this Rule.
ABA Informal Opinion 1273 7 examines D.R. 6-101(A)(3) and
states the proper application of the Rule. It notes that "[n]eglect
involves indifference and a consistent failure to carry out the obligations which the lawyer has assumed to his client or a conscious disre74.

MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT

55 (1980).
75. The New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division has applied DR 6-101(A)(3)
only where an attorney has ignored an entrusted legal matter while the client was under the
impression his interest was being represented. See In The Matter of McGrath, 96 A.D.2d 267,
468 N.Y.S.2d 349 (1st Dept. 1983) (attorney's failure to appear for two scheduled pre-trial
conferences resulting in the complaintant case being marked "off calendar," and his failure to
restore the case to calendar coupled with his failure to respond under subpoena before the
Disciplinary Committee on a complaint arising out of the case constituted neglect); In The
Matter of Leverton, 56 A.D.2d 157, 392 N.Y.S.2d 133 (4th Dept. 1977) (attorney's failure to
commence a negligence action for clients after assuring clients that the case was in suit, and
which resulted in the cause of action being barred by the statute of limitations, violated DR 6101(A)(3)); In The Matter of Livadas, 43 A.D.2d 120, 350 N.Y.S.2d 35 (4th Dept. 1973) (an
attorney who failed to timely file income tax returns for a client who retained him for that
purpose, did not answer his clients inquiries and who finally gave false explanations for his
delay violated DR 6-101(A)(3) even though he ultimately paid tax penalty and interest after
the state bar's intervention).
76. The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution states: "In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to . . . have the assistance of counsel for his
defense." U.S. CONST. amend. VI. In Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) the Supreme
Court held that "fundamental and essential" constitutional considerations of fair procedure
and equal treatment required the appointment of counsel to indigent defendants charged with
felonies. Id. at 344. In Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972) the Court held that indigent defendants accused of misdemeanors had the right to counsel. Id. at 37.
The Sixth Amendment mandate is now widely construed as requiring "the reasonably
competent assistance of an attorney acting as [a] diligent conscientious advocate." U.S. v.
DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197, 1202 (D.C. Cir. 1973); But see Brinkley v. Lefevre, 621 F.2d 45 (2d
Cir.) (Weinstein, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 868 (1980) (The Second Circuit, unlike all other courts of appeals, does not accept the "reasonably competent" standard; it still
applies the "farce and mockery" test in assessing inadequacy of counsel.) A discussion of the
Sixth Amendment right to competent representation in the context of the 1982 Society staff
attorney strike is beyond the scope of this Note.
77. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1273 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as Informal Op. 1273], reprinted in COMMITTEE ON ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, ABA, 2 INFORMAL ETHICS OPINIONS at 529 (1975) [hereinafter cited
as

INFORMAL OPINIONS].
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gard for the responsibility owed to the client."' 78 This comment was
elicited in response to a series of questions regarding attorney inactivity in a case, failure to note applicable statutes of limitation, and
instances of ordinary negligence.79 D.R. 6-101(A)(3) does not apply
to a strike, such as that of Society staff attorneys in 1982. Those
attorneys were concerned that overcrowded caseloads would cause
them to fall below a minimum standard of professional competence.
D.R. 6-101 (A) (3) should not be applied to characterize as "neglect"
a refusal to represent presently assigned clients in order to raise the
quality of representation of future clients to meet the minimum standard of competence. To imply otherwise, as does Ethical Opinion 8275, distorts the Code.
A more appropriate understanding of the relationship of D.R. 6101 (A) (3) to a strike by staff attorneys of the Society may be found
in ABA Informal Opinion 1325.0 That opinion addressed the issue
of neglect arising out of a strike by unionized attorneys. It observed
that "it is not necessarily true that such participation would violate
D.R. 6-101(A)(3)." 8 1 This statement is followed by annotation asking the reader to distinguish Informal Opinion 1325 from Informal
Opinion 1273. Informal Opinion 1325 observes that strike activity in
some circumstances may be no more disruptive of the performance
of legal work than "taking a

. .

. vacation .*.".

."2 It would not be

responsible to contend that an attorney who took a vacation had violated this D.R. when a procedure to provide client representation in
his absence was available.83 It is equally spurious reasoning to contend that a strike action, per se, is any more neglectful where surrogate counsel is available for the strike's duration.
B. Attorney Self-Evaluation of Neglect
Staff attorneys for the Society comprise a group of highly capa78.
79.

Id.
Id.

80. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1325 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Informal Op. 1325], reprinted in STANDING COMMITTEE ON ETHICS AND
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, ABA, FORMAL AND INFORMAL ETHICS OPINIONS at 199
(1985) [hereinafter cited as ETHICS OPINIONS].
81. Id. at 200.
82. Id.
83. Union official Laura Friedman of the National Organization of Legal Service Workers (NOLSW) notes that "striking lawyers often take steps to minimize any potential harms to
'If a lawyer is in the middle of a case, he'll finish it' . . and for other cases 'the
clients ....
lawyer will prepare transitional memos for the management or try to get the cases adjourned.'" Flaherty, supra note 1, at 36, col. 1-2.
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ble lawyers. 84 In the popular press, Society staff attorneys have been
portrayed as resourceful, vigorous advocates of their clients' rights. 85
Their assessment that continued handling of excessive caseloads
would result in an on-going violation of D.R. 6-101(A) (3) should not
be taken lightly. Nonetheless, critics are skeptical at the thought

that staff attorneys of a legal aid society can credibly decide when
the minimum standard of competent representation is no longer
met.86
It is the responsibility of defense attorneys, such as those of the
Society, to determine when overcrowded caseloads cause services to

drop below the minimum level of competence required by the Code.
The ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 7 place the onus on the
defense attorney to determine when the adequacy of the defense efforts no longer meets the professional duty the lawyer has assumed.
Standard 5-4.3, titled Workload, states in pertinent part:
Whenever . . . assigned counsel determine, in the exercise of their
best professional judgment, that the acceptance of additional cases
. . . will lead to the furnishing of representation lacking in quality
or to the breach of professional obligations, the. . . assigned counsel must take such steps as may be appropriate to reduce their
pending or projected workloads.88
84. H. Buttenweiser, Memorandum of the Legal Aid Society to the Mayor's Advisory
Panel on Representation of the Indigent in Criminal Cases (December 1982) (unpublished
manuscript) "The Society's staff is heavily populated with young attorneys who have been
editors of the law reviews of their respective law schools, have clerked for federal and state
judges, and have had considerable clinical experience in criminal trial advocacy."
85. See generally Pileggi, The Last Liberals, NEw YORK, Sept. 13, 1982, at 29.
86. See, e.g., Lewis, supra note 1, at 20. But see I ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE.

5-4.3 Commentary (1980).

87. 1 ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1980). The Introduction to Chapter 5,
"Providing Defense Services," states that
since there can be no guarantee that the defendant's lawyer will be the professional
equal of his or her opponent, it is most important that the system for providing
counsel and facilities for the defense be as strong and as vital as possible ....
The
growth and acceptance of organized defender services are responsible for important
changes in several standards and the addition of a brand new one. [B]ecause defender programs in particular must frequently handle excessive caseloads, a standard concerning workload has been added to the chapter.
Id. at 5.5-5.6.
88. Id. at 5.47. The commentary to Standard 5-4.3 provides that
[o]ne of the most significant impediments to the furnishing of quality defense services for the poor is the presence of excessive workloads ....
[N]ot even the most
able and industrious lawyers can provide quality representation when their workloads are unmanageable. Excessive workloads, moreover, lead to attorney frustration, disillusionment by clients, and weakening of the adversary system.
Id. at 5.48. An overview of different approaches employed by defender offices to assess workload levels is presented in the Commentary to Standard 5-4.3. Id. at 5.48-5.49.
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The expectation contained in the ABA Standard is that staff
lawyers of a legal aid organization are capable of recognizing when
excessive case demands make it impossible for them to render competent representation. In the case of the striking Society staff attorneys, objective indicia supported their claim that caseloads had become too great. 89
C. D.R. 6-101(A)(3) As a Strike Justification

When properly understood to apply to the competency of representation in an on-going attorney-client relationship, D.R. 6101(A)(3) justifies a strike. ABA Informal Opinion 135990 provides

an alternative view of that Disciplinary Rule to that of Ethical Opinion 82-75. Informal Opinion 1359 commented on a situation where
the refusal of the directors of a legal services office to institute a
system of priorities or waiting lists resulted in an allegedly unmanageable caseload for each staff attorney. The ABA Committee on
Ethics recognized the pernicious impact of caseload overcrowding by
acknowledging that it may result in inadequate legal advice. Citing
D.R. 6-101(A)(2)91 and (3), it held that the "refusal to establish
priorities is improper if it causes a violation of D.R. 6-101. "92 Thus,
Informal Opinion 1359 notes that refusal by legal aid directors to
establish priorities could cause Code violations if it results in "inadequate preparation" or "neglect" by a staff attorney.
In the summer and fall of 1982, Society attorney supervisors did
little to alleviate caseload overcrowding even though internal office
grievance procedures were invoked.9 3 The union contract then in
force with the Society contained a provision permitting a staff attorney to file a grievance where he determined that the "'burden of
work for which he is responsible is about to reach a point beyond
89. Gerstl, supra note 70, at 4. The Society is assigned seventy percent of all criminal
cases in the City (except homicides). Flaherty, supra note 69, at 2, col. 3-4. In the eighteen-

month period preceding the strike vote, the number of criminal indictments in the City increased by forty-two percent, while the number of attorneys on the Society's staff grew by
sixteen percent.
90. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1359 (1976)

[hereinafter cited as Informal Op. 1359], reprintedin ETHICS OPINIONS, supra note 80, at 237.
91. DR 6-10](A)(2) states: "A lawyer shall not: . . . [h]andle a legal matter without
preparation adequate in the circumstances." CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra

note 44, at 465.
92. Informal Op. 1359, supra note 90 at 237.
93. Flaherty, supra note 69, at 16, col. 4. "[L]awyer, Weldon Brewer, filed a grievance
Aug. 26, claiming that his 65 case workload prevented him from adequately representing his
clients. Mr. Brewer contended that to continue to shoulder such a workload would violate
several disciplinary rules of the Code of Professional Responsibility." Id.
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which cases cannot be accepted consistent with professional responsibility.' ,,94 The ten week strike by staff attorneys over inadequate pay
and excessive caseload assignments may have been precipitated by
the Society's firing of the attorney who pursued a grievance to arbitration under that provision of the contract.9 5
In the view of striking staff attorneys, Society management
compelled staff attorneys to work under conditions bordering on direct violation of D.R. 6-101(A)(2) and (3). By taking no action to
substantially relieve case overloading and by thwarting the actions of
a conscientious attorney attempting to utilize an established grievance procedure, 96 Society management violated Informal Opinion
1359. Further, management left staff attorneys with no alternative,
other than striking, that would pressure the Society to remedy the
threat to competent client representation.
D. Other Disciplinary Rules Justify the Strike
The Code provision D.R. 1-102(A)(1) states that "[a] lawyer
shall not: . . . [v]iolate a Disciplinary Rule. '9 7 Attorney misconduct
is further defined by D.R. 1-102(A)(5) which proscribes "conduct
that is prejudicial to the administration of justice."9 8 D.R. 7101(A)(3) admonishes the attorney not to "[p]rejudice or damage
his client during the course of the professional relationship ....,,99
These D.R.'s placed the Society staff attorney/employees in a bind
of competing loyalties: to uphold the Code while maintaining fidelity
to their employer.
Under a careful analysis of the Code, the potential for neglect
of assigned clients as the result of a conspicuous strike is less harmful than insidious, incompetent client representation on a daily basis
by overburdened attorneys. In light of the complex nature of the
problem confronting Society staff attorneys in October 1982, and the
absence of a clear guideline to advise them, their decision to strike
was ethically justified on the basis of D.R.'s contained in the Code.
The Code's provision for disciplinary action against lawyers who
harm their clients because of inadequate preparation was a legitimate motivating factor for the strike.
94. Lewis, supra note 1, at 20.
95. See Flaherty, supra note 69, at 16, col. 4.
96.

Id.

97. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
98. Id.
99. Id. at 486.

RESPONSIBILITY,

supra note 44, at 361.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol2/iss2/5

18

1985]

Arthur: The 1982 New
York
Legal
AidLegal
StrikeAid Strike: Ethical Implications Under th

VI.

ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

A. Attorneys Should Improve the Legal System
In addition to D.R.'s, E.C.'s also support the decision of staff
attorneys to strike. The Code does not specifically address the issue
of whether an attorney strike, per se, is ethical. The Code does provide direction to the attorney who must choose between loyalty to his
employer and the responsibility to provide competent counsel to
criminally charged indigent clients. Many E.C.'s lend support for the
staff attorneys' judgment that a strike against the Society was the
most appropriate avenue available to improve the legal system. One
such maxim is E.C. 1-1, which states in pertinent part that "every
person in our society should have ready access to the independent
professional services of a lawyer of integrity and competence. Maintaining the integrity and improving the competence of the bar to
meet the highest standards is the ethical duty of every lawyer." 100
Similarly, E.C. 8-1101 and E.C. 8-3102 challenge members of the profession to assist in improving the legal system.10 3 Their efforts are to
be motivated by an altruistic desire to improve the quality of legal
services. E.C. 6-5 asserts that a lawyer's "obligation to act competently calls for higher motivation than that arising from fear of civil
liability or disciplinary penalty." 04
B. An EarlierStrike Improved the Legal System
The effort by staff attorneys in October 1982 to improve the
quality of representation of their indigent clients by striking should
be viewed in light of the attorney union's own unique history of interaction with the Society. In 1973,105 a similar action against the
Society was successful in achieving the adoption by the Society of
100.

E.C. 1-I. Id. at 358.

101.

Id. at 500. "Changes in human affairs and imperfections in human institutions

make necessary constant efforts to maintain and improve our legal system. . . .By reason of
education and experience, lawyers are especially qualified to recognize deficiencies in the legal

system and to initiate corrective measures therein." Id.
102. Id. at 501. "The fair administration of justice requires the availability of competent
lawyers . . . .Those persons unable to pay for legal services should be provided needed services." Id.
103. Provision E.C. 8-9, which was not incorporated in the New York Code, states:

"The advancement of our legal system is of vital importance in maintaining the rule of law
and in facilitating orderly changes; therefore, lawyers should encourage, and should aid in

making, needed changes and improvements." MODEL CODE E.C. 8-9.
104. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 44, at 464.
105. The [1982] strike [was] the fourth since the City hired the Society in 1966. There
were strikes in 1970, 1973, and 1974." Shipp, .supranote 8, at B2, col. 1.
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continuity of representation. Under this policy, each client, instead
of being shuffled from one lawyer to another on each successive court
date, has the benefit of representation by the same attorney throughout the trial court proceedings.10 6 Despite a 1971 recommendation
by the New York State Appellate Division that continuity be
adopted,10 7 and the endorsement of the Association of the Bar of the
City of New York, 08 the Society, in 1973, still had not implemented
the policy. The major demand of the staff attorneys' 1973 six-day
strike against the Society was that continuity of representation be
adopted. 0 9
To settle the 1973 strike, the Society management instituted a
policy of continuity. One indication of the policy's viability in Society practice is that the system is still in use today. 0 In a December
1982 memorandum to the Mayor's Advisory Panel on Representation of the Indigent in criminal cases,"' the Society's continuity policy was highly touted." 2 The memorandum sought to convince
Mayor Edward Koch that the Society was the best entity available
to provide quality representation to the indigent at low cost to the
City. The continuity policy was cited by Society management as a
positive innovation and contribution to the representation of indigent
clients by the Society. In the 1982 statement, Society management
lauded continuity as having "become widely recognized as an essential predicate of effective representation."" 3 The success of the 1973
strike action illustrates that a strike can be used effectively by attorneys as a vehicle for improving the delivery of legal services to indigent clients." 4
106.

For a discussion of the merits of adopting continuity of representation, see the

Commentary to Standard 5-5.2. in

STANDARDS FOR

CRIMINAL

JUSTICE,

supra note 86.

107.

Gerstl, supra note 70 at 2; Freedman, supra note 61, at 2, col. 7.

108.

Gerstl, supra note 70, at 2-3; Freedman, supra note 61 at 2, col. 7-8.

109.

Gerstl, supra note 70, at 3.

110. Id. See, e.g., ABA
111.

STANDARD FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE

5.53 (1979).

Shipp, supra note 8, at B2, col. 1. Following the October 1982 strike by Society

staff attorneys, Mayor Edward Koch of New York City appointed an advisory panel of three
attorneys to study the question of whether the contractual arrangement with the Society
should be retained. "The city has the power under State law to hire the society, to set up a

public defender system with an office staffed by city lawyers, to hire private lawyers on a caseby-ease basis or to use any combination." Id.
112.

Buttenweiser, supra note 84, at 6.

113. Id.
114. Gerstl, supra note 70 at 3. According to Gersti, in 1973, the union of Legal Aid
attorneys had a choice:
either to compromise their professional standards by acquiescing to ethically untenable representational policies with immediate and long-term detrimental impact on
their clients, or to uphold their professional standards by a concerted action which,
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One would be hard-pressed to compose a hypothetical example
that would better illustrate an attorney's effort to improve the legal
system in accordance with the challenge of the Code's E.C.'s than
that provided by the strike against the Society in 1973. Likewise, the
strike in 1982 to avoid the deleterious impact of severely overcrowded caseloads was a responsible effort by attorneys to improve
the quality of client representation.
VII.

THE ISSUE OF ATTORNEY WITHDRAWAL FROM

REPRESENTATION

A.

Ethical Opinion 82-75 Misapplied D.R. 2-110

Ethical Opinion 82-75 betrays a cursory reading of the Code
and an unsupportable conclusion that D.R. 2-1 1 0 115 and D.R. 7-101
(A)(2)""6 were violated by the Society staff attorneys' strike of 1982.
The opinion's wording conveys the impression that following an exhaustive analysis by the Committee, the strike was found to violate
these specific D.R.'s. Upon a close examination, however, the conclusion that the strike was an infraction of these two D.R.'s is
troublesome.
Indigent criminal defendants who receive services from the Society are not assigned by the court to a specific staff attorney.
1 17
Rather, the court designates the Society as the counsel of record.
Society attorney supervisors then assign cases to specific staff attorneys. Therefore, a strike by staff attorneys against their employer is
not appropriately viewed under D.R. 2-110 as withdrawal from employment. Only a withdrawal from representation by the Society
would constitute withdrawal under D.R. 2-110 in this context. By
while unavoidably causing short-term hardship to some, would, by causing reform,
benefit a far greater number of clients over the long term and generally advance the

interests of justice.
Cf. N.Y. Times, Dec. 20, 1982, at B4, col. 6. Striking staff attorneys insisted that the 1982
strike was for the ultimate benefit of their clients. One such lawyer, Jona Schuder, was re-

ported to have observed that because of low pay, some lawyers could not afford to work for the
Society. "Every single person on that line cares a great deal about their clients or they
wouldn't have taken this job . . . .In the long run it's going to be much better for our clients.
That's why people are willing to strike."
115. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 44, at 419. DR 2-110(A)(1)

provides: "If permission for withdrawal from employment is required by the rules of a tribunal, a lawyer shall not withdraw from employment in a proceeding before that tribunal without its permission."
116. Id. at 486. "A lawyer shall not intentionally: . . .Fail to carry out a contract of
employment entered into with a client for professional services . . . ." Id.
117. Interview with Lizabeth Shalen, of the Association of Legal Aid Attorneys of the

City of New York (Nov. 4, 1983).
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declining to acknowledge this distinction, the Committee misapplied
D.R. 2-110.
Ethical Opinion 82-75 takes the view that a relationship between an indigent client and a Society staff attorney "is not functionally distinguishable from a 'contract of employment' as that term
is used in [D.R. 7-101(A)(2)]."I l l This view is inconsistent with an
ABA Ethics Committee statement on the matter in Formal Opinion
334.119 It holds that "[i]t must be recognized that an indigent person

who seeks assistance from a legal services office has a lawyer client
relationship with its staff of lawyers which is the same as any other
client who retains a law firm to represent him. It is the firm, not the
individual lawyer, who is retained."1 20
Ethical Opinion 82-75 does a disservice to scrupulous attorneys
by making a vague allusion to D.R. 2-110 without specifying which
component of the provision would be violated by a strike. This ambiguity is heightened because D.R. 7-101(A)(2) contains an exception
for its standard against withdrawal from a contract of employment,
where withdrawal is made under D.R. 2-110.
The latter D.R. indicates that an attorney must not continue
representation where a Disciplinary Rule is being violated. An examination of the text of the ABA Model Code reveals a footnote1 21 immediately following the D.R.'s subtitle, which refers the reader to
Canon 44 of the superseded Canon of Ethics. As a point of reference
for persuasive interpretation of D.R. 2-110, Canon 44 is informative..
Canon 44 lists as an example of when an attorney may withdraw, a
situation where "the lawyer finds himself incapable of conducting
the case effectively. '122 That concept of allowable withdrawal has
been carried over in the present statute in D.R. 2-110(B) 12 3 and
(C). 124 Either of these provisions provides a basis for discontinuing
118.

Ethical Opinion 82-75, supra note 10, at 11.

119. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 334 (1974),
reprinted in ETHICS OPINIONS, supra note 80, at 78.
120.

Id.

121. Footnote 1 of the ABA Model Code was not adopted in the New York Code.
122. CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS. Canon 44 (1957).
123. DR 2-110(B) provides: "Mandatory withdrawal. A lawyer representing a client
before a tribunal, with its permission

. . .

shall withdraw from employment

. . .

if.

.

. (2)

[The lawyer] knows or it is obvious that his continued employment will result in violation of a
Disciplinary Rule ...." CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 44, at 419.
124.

DR 2-110(C) provides:

Permissive withdrawal. If DR 2-110(B) is not applicable, a lawyer may not request
permission to withdraw in matters pending before a tribunal, and may not withdraw
in other matters, unless such a request or such withdrawal is because: .... (2)
[the lawyer's] continued employment is likely to result in a violation of a Discipli-
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representation when a Disciplinary Rule is being violated.
B. D.R. 2-110 Is Inadequate to Apply to a Legal Aid Service
Though D.R. 2-110(B) and (C) detail numerous acts and factors that make withdrawal either permissive or mandatory, they do
not address attorney strikes. These Code sections on withdrawal are
inadequate for application to the October 1982 strike. D.R. 2-110
(B)(2) proirides that where a matter is being represented before a
tribunal, permission of the court is required for withdrawal if required by court rules. This is the case even where withdrawal is
mandated because the attorney "knows" or "it is obvious" that continued employment will result in a disciplinary infraction. This provision, and the corresponding provision in D.R. 2-110(C)(2), contemplate an attorney-client relationship in which private practitioner
receives a fee in return for his services. These provisions do not envision a situation where an organization like the Society is the attorney. Indeed, where the attorney is an employee of a legal aid organization, his only recourse is to complain to his employer about an
excessive caseload. Because the employer is counsel of record, the
lawyer/employee has no standing to directly apply to court to withdraw. Further, a leading authority on legal ethics has observed that
most withdrawal issues are addressed in other sections of the
Code. 125 Therefore, the application of D.R. 2-110(B)(2) and (C)(2)
to a legal aid staff attorney strike is all the more difficult to justify.
Both D.R. 2-1 10(B)(2) and (C)(2) are similar in that they prescribe withdrawal from a case where continuing with employment
would subject the attorney to an infraction of a D.R. The degree of
certainty in the attorney's conviction that a D.R. is being violated is
pivotal to the distinction between the two. D.R. 2-110(C)(2) uses a
less stringent standard allowing permissible withdrawal where continued employment "is likely to result in" a D.R. violation.
Even under D.R. 2-110(C)(2)'s relaxed standard, the only responsible choice the attorney has when a D.R. is being violated is to
discontinue representation. This would be the result where unmanageable caseloads made it "likely" that inadequate representation
will occur. Under both D.R.'s, the stated condition for withdrawal
requiring the attorney to gain the permission of the court is that the
attorney in question be the counsel of record. This limitation exposes
nary Rule.

Id. at 419-20.
125. ANNOTATED

CODE OF PROFFSSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
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the inadequacy of D.R. 2-110 in addressing a strike involving the
staff attorneys of a legal services organization.128
C. Adequate Notice of Withdrawal Under D.R. 2-110(A)(3)
Notwithstanding the inadequacy of the withdrawal provisions
found in D.R. 2-110(B)(2), D.R. 2-110(A)(2) 1 27 does articulate a
minimum standard of notice that has utility where representation of
previously assigned clients whose cases are not at trial or hearing
stages will be discontinued due to a strike. When judges are put on
notice of the inadequacy of legal representation to indigents and the
pendency of a corrective strike, the onus is on the judiciary to appoint surrogate counsel.
Professor Freedman, a noted expert on legal ethics 28 who commented on the issue of attorney withdrawal in the context of the
1973 strike by staff attorneys of the Society, stated that where
judges act promptly to appoint private counsel in response to a
strike, no client's interests need be compromised. 29 Professor Freedman observed that the court has a duty to appoint counsel from the
private bar upon notice that no Society lawyer is available to represent a client.130

The availability of legal representation need not be a casualty of
a strike."' 1 In the case of undue delay in appointing surrogate coun126. See supra notes 115-117 and accompanying text.
127. DR 2-110(A) provides: "(2) In any event, a lawyer shall not withdraw from employment until he has taken reasonable steps to avoid foreseeable prejudice to the rights of the
client, including giving due notice to his client, allowing time for employment of other counsel
." CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 44, at 419.
128. See supra note 60.
129. Freedman, supra note 61, at 2, col. 8.
130. Id.
131. See generally N.Y. Times, Dec. 20, 1982, at Al, col. 4. During the strike, the
Society's 118 non-union supervising and 25 to 50 non-striking staff attorneys handled pending
civil and criminal matters. The Society's 20 paralegals handled cases before administrative
boards. The City made a successful effort to recruit members of the private bar to assist primarily in criminal arraignments. N.Y. County Law § 722-b (McKinney 1972) provides that
localities shall appoint members of the private bar to represent indigent defendants for a fee of
$25.00 per hour.
Nine weeks into the strike, New York City's court officials and district attorneys indicated
that the courts had managed to take up much of the "slack" through resort to the private bar.
Although case backlogs estimated at 4 to 6 months had developed as had severe crowding at
the City's jails, it was difficult to assess to what extent such conditions were attributable to the
strike.
City Correction Department spokesman Edward Hershey said: "Normally our population
goes down in the last couple of weeks before Christmas .

. .

. But it has not gone down this

year. We have no way of knowing for sure how much of this is due to the strike, but common
sense would tell us that the strike is responsible for some of the problem." Id. at B4, col. 5.
Robert M. Morgenthau, the Manhattan District Attorney, explained that because of the extra
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sel from the private bar, the defendant should be released on his own
recognizance or the case should be dismissed "for want of prosecution or denial of the constitutional right to a speedy trial." 132 The

Code encourages the private bar to assist in the defense of indigent
clients'33 by express wording in E.C. 2-25.134 With active case repre-

sentation by Society attorney/supervisors and emergency representation by members of the private bar, 35 the disruptive impact of a
strike on the smooth functioning of the court system is not as devastating as a reading of Ethical Opinion 82-75 might lead one to believe.1 36 In a strike, clients need not be abandoned without the bene-

fit of counsel.
D.

The Committee Should Reverse Its Position

An attorney who read Ethical Opinion 82-75's analysis of D.R.
2-110 could not help but conclude that a strike would be a violation

of professional ethics. The distortion of D.R. 2-110 and D.R. 7102(A)(2) contributed by Ethical Opinion 82-75 to the body of eth-

ics opinions results in the dissemination of erroneous advice. The
Committee should promptly retract the section of Ethical Opinion

82-75 which discusses the application of D.R. 2-110 and D.R. 7101(A)(2) to a strike.
work completed by Society attorney supervisors and private lawyers, the strike's effect on the
courts had been minimal. "There is such a backlog of cases that so far it really hasn't had that
much effect," he said. "There are plenty of cases to keep the trial parts busy." Id. at B4, col.
6.
Realistically, there are limits to the reliance that can be placed upon the efforts of supervisory attorneys and members of the private bar in such a context. Although surrogate counsel
sufficed in substituting for the striking staff attorneys through the ninth week, some spokesmen
doubted that such stop-gap measures could succeed for an indefinite period. Id.
132. Freedman, supra note 61, at 2, col. 6.
133. For a discussion of how the supply of private attorneys willing to take over cases
previously assigned to the Legal Aid Society allegedly dwindled as the strike progressed, see
generally N.Y. Times Dec. 20, 1982, at B4, col. 5., and Treaster, 150 Arraigned Without
Lawyers in Queens Court, N.Y. Times, Nov. 5, 1982, at B4, col. 3.
134. EC 2-25 provides:
Historically, the need for legal services of those unable to pay reasonable fees has
been met in part by lawyers who donated their services or accepted court appointments on behalf of such individuals. The basic responsibility for providing legal services for those unable to pay ultimately rests upon the individual lawyer .
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 44, at 377-378.
135. Ethical Opinion 82-75 refers to the responsibility of the private bar under EC 2-25
but fails to relate the availability of such services to the concept of withdrawal from employment under DR 2-110.
136. Ethical Opinion 82-75's conclusion that legal aid attorneys' failure to provide services to existing clients would result in neglect of client representation in violation of DR 6131(A)(3) is thus negated.
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EXERTION OF THIRD PARTY INFLUENCE

Attorneys Must Exercise Independent Judgment

An issue which Ethical Opinion 82-75 examines only briefly is
whether third party influence on the decision of staff attorneys to
strike violated professional ethics. The Canon 5 axiom: "A Lawyer
Should Exercise Independent Professional Judgment on Behalf of a
Client" 137 was fulfilled by each staff attorney who decided that a
strike was necessary to avoid continued violations of D.R.'s concerning the adequacy of client representation. Ethical Opinion 82-75
cited Canon 5, but did not explicitly assert that attorneys who voted
to strike to improve the legal system did so only after knuckling
under to union pressure in abrogation of this goal. Using imprecise
expression, the Committee observed that "legal aid attorneys contemplating strike activities may not permit either their employer or
their union to interfere with the fulfillment" of their obligations
under Canon 5.138
In October, 1982 Society management attempted to unduly influence staff attorneys' independent judgment with respect to
caseload size by encouraging them to continue working despite the
prohibitive number of cases. 13 9 By declining to appreciably reduce
caseload overcrowding in response to the challenge of complaining
lawyers, management allegedly contributed to the problem and
risked that the quality of representation would drop below the minimum standard established by the Code. E.C. provisions contained in
Canon 5 recognize that independent judgment of the attorney is especially vulnerable to third party pressure when the third party seeking to exert influence is paying the client's fees. E.C. 5-23,14° E.C. 521,141 E.C. 5_1,142 and E.C. 5-13143 admonish the attorney to main137.
138.

CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Canon 5, supra note 44, at 438.

Ethical Opinion 82-75, supra note 10, at 7.

139. See Flaherty, supra note 69.
140. EC 5-23 provides:
A person or organization that pays or furnishes lawyers to represent others possesses

a potential power to exert strong pressures against the independent judgment of
those lawyers . .

.

.Since a lawyer must always be free to exercise his professional

judgment without regard to the interests or motives of a third person, the lawyer
who is employed by one to represent another must constantly guard against erosion
of his professional freedom. (footnotes omitted).
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 44, at 450.
141. EC 5-21 provides:

The obligation of a lawyer to exercise professional judgment solely on behalf of his
client requires that he disregard the desires of others that might impair his free

judgment. The desires of a third person will seldom adversely affect a lawyer unless
that person is in a position to exert strong economic, political, or social pressures
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tain professional independence at all times.144
B.

Adhering to D.R. 5-107(B)145 in a Legal Services
Organization

An attorney who permitted an employer's economic power to
persuade him to continue client representation against the attorney's
better professional judgment would breach D.R. 5-107(B). ABA

Formal Opinion 324141 found that it was within the purview of the
governing board of a legal aid society to impose broad policy restricupon the lawyer. (footnotes omitted).

Id. at 449.
142. EC 5-1 provides: The professional judgment of a lawyer should be exercised, within
the bounds of the law, solely for the benefit of his client and free of compromising influences
and loyalties. (footnotes omitted). Id. at 438.
143. EC 5-13 provides:
A lawyer should not maintain membership in or be influenced by any organization
of employees that undertakes to prescribe, direct, or suggest when or how he should
fulfill his professional obligations to a person or organization that employs him as a
lawyer. Although it is not necessarily improper for a lawyer employed by a corporation or similar entity to be a member of an organization of employees, he should be
vigilant to safeguard his fidelity as a lawyer to his employer, free from outside
influences.
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 44, at 445.
144. In other contexts, attention has also centered on the potential abuse of union influence by exerting pressure on attorney/employees to strike over frivolous issues. Flaherty, supra
note 1, at 31, col. 4. Informal Op. 1325, supra note 80 distinguishes between membership in
an employee organization and acts by members that breach D.R.'s. The opinion observes that
"[it is possible that a lawyer who is a member of a union or bargaining organization will not
violate any Disciplinary Rules as a result of his membership." Id. Nevertheless, the Opinion
concludes: "lawyers who are union members should not permit the organization to prescribe,
direct or suggest how to fulfill one's professional obligations." Id. at 3. Cf. Informal Opinion
1029, where the Committee said that it was not necessary that a union organization's by-laws
stipulate that lawyer-members be bound by their obligations under the Canons of Ethics so
long as attorneys adhered to ethical rules.
In the instance of the Fall 1982 strike by staff attorneys of the Society, the union comprised a unit of individuals who shared the same employer and worked under similar circumstances. The striking union members shared a consensus that the quality of client representation was at least on the verge of falling below the Code's minimum standard of competency,
and were confronted with an employer unresponsive to their dilemma. Not all Society staff
attorneys joined the October 1982 strike, despite pressure from fellow employees not to work.
Approximately 35 to 50 staff attorneys declined to participate in the strike action. N.Y. Times,
Dec. 20, 1982, at B4, col. 5. At one point the Society "charged in state court that the union
ha[d] illegally threatened reprisals against staff attorneys who continue to work." Flaherty,
N.Y. Lawyers Strike Shuts Some Courts, Nat'1 L.J., Dec. 6, 1982, at 6, col. 3.
145. DR 5-107(B) provides: "A lawyer shall not permit a person who recommends, employs, or pays him to render legal services for another to direct or regulate his professional
judgment in rendering such legal services." CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra
note 44 at 461.
146. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 324 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as Formal Op. 324], reprinted in ETHIcs OPINONS, supra note 80, at 51.
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tions 147 on the types of cases staff attorneys could take and types of
clients they could represent. 14 8 Nevertheless, Formal Opinion 324
noted that D.R. 5-107(B) "militate[s] against any interference with
the lawyer-client relationship by the directors of a legal aid society
after a case has been assigned to a staff attorney."'1 49 In ABA Formal Opinion 334,150 the Ethics Committee went even further and
found that staff lawyers of a legal aid society have an obligation
under D.R. 5-107(B) to refuse to acquiesce in governing board policy that interferes with the attorney's exercise of independent professional judgment on behalf of a client, or that is inconsistent with the
Code. 5 '
D.R. 5-107(B), as interpreted in Formal Opinions 324 and 334,
directs the attorney-employee to zealously safeguard the integrity of
representation he provides to clients on behalf of a third party employer lest that employer interfere with the exercise of his professional discretion. In October 1982, staff attorneys of the Society did
not flinch from their professional duty to their clients under the
Code. Despite pressure from their employer, many elected to endure
the personal inconvenience and financial hardship concomitant with
a strike rather than accede to the implicit demand of society management that they continue to represent clients in derogation of the
Code.
IX.

INADEQUACY OF SALARY AS A BASIS FOR A STRIKE

Under the Model Code, staff attorneys of the Society were justified in calling for an increase in wages that had become inadequate
by the time of the 1982 strike. 152 E.C. 2-17153 states in pertinent part
147. Comparing the desirability of promulgating board policy guidelines with a procedure where potential clients are accepted on a case-by-case basis, the Committee observed:
"There is in a case-by-case consideration the very real danger that the more controversial

causes - those which often provide opportunities for law reforms aiding the poor - will be
subject to board veto solely because of a fear of criticism from certain influential segments of
the community." Id. at 55.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 54.
150. Formal Op. 334, supra note 119, at 78.
151. Id. at 82.
152. Even after adopting the negotiated settlement with the Society, beginning salaries

of staff attorneys are well below starting salaries with the major law firms where many staff
attorneys would have been competitive job applicants. See Buttenweiser, supra note 84. As

such, these staff attorneys consider themselves underpaid and overworked. Further, caseload
size has consistently grown. In 1973, the average criminal defense lawyer at the Society handled approximately 37 cases at a time. In December of the year following the settlement, the
typical caseload was 53. N.Y. Times, Dec. 12, 1983, at Bll, col. 2.

A major concern of staff attorneys at the time of the strike was that their salaries had
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that "adequate compensation is necessary in order to enable the lawyer to serve his client effectively and to preserve the integrity and

independence of the profession. ' 115 The striking staff attorneys of the
Society were reacting in part to the fact that their relatively low

wages impelled a high rate of turnover of long term, experienced
litigators. 5 5 This loss ultimately undermined the caliber of the legal

representation available1 56 to criminally charged clients, which
verged on below-minimum competency. As attorney-employees,
these union members were exercising their recognized right under
the Act to bargain and, if necessary, strike regarding the terms and
conditions of their employment.157 The impact of substandard wages
on the morale of staff attorneys in fulfilling the demands of their
pressured jobs should not be overlooked. 5 8 Furthermore, low pay has
fallen below even those of assistant district attorneys, with which their wages had formerly
been comparable. "If they can come up with an assistant district attorney (A.D.A.) who after
10 years earns only $37,000, I will go back to work post haste .... There is no such animal,"
said striker Charles S. Bobis, a Legal Aid Lawyer with 10 years tenure. N.Y. Times, Nov. 11,
1982, at B4, col. 4.
The Society argued that its pre-strike offer was close to the salaries paid A.D.A.'s and
that should suffice. Id. at B4, col. 3. Further, spokeswoman Patricia Bath claimed the Society
based its offer on an average of the base salaries paid by district attorneys in Manhattan,
Brooklyn, and the Bronx through the fifth year. The staff lawyers rejected that approach. Gary
Sloman, a striking staff attorney reportedly observed: "It's like apples and oranges. We recognize that you would look to similar jobs for a range of salaries. But it's a reference point and
no more." Id. at B4, col. 4.
153. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILITY, supra note 44, at 374. The last sentence
and footnote of EC 2-17 as promulgated in the Model Code was adopted by New York in
1970, but subsequently deleted in April 1978. 2A NAT'L RaP. LEGAL AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY. However, it did remain part of the ABA Model Code until it was replaced by
the Model Rules.
154. Id.
155. "In the strike of 1982, inadequate salaries remained an issue .... The salaries of
attorneys with more than 5 years bxperience remained too low to prevent a high turnover
among the senior staff, with a corresponding adverse impact on the quality of legal service
rendered." Gerstl, supra note 70, at 5.
156. See Flaherty, supra note at 31, col. 2.
157. See supra notes 14 - 38 and accompanying text. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1947).
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing,
and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining
or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any
or all of such activities ....
29 U.S.C. § 157 (1947).
158. The footnote to EC 2-17 recognizes the relationship between low pay and the quality of legal services. "When members of the Bar are induced to render legal services for inadequate compensation, as a consequence the quality of the service rendered may be lowered, the
welfare of the profession injured and the administration of justice made less efficient." CODE
OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY,

supra note 44 at 374 (citing ABA Comm. on Ethics and

Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 302 (1961)).
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an inhibiting effect on recruitment of capable lawyers. 159 Society
lawyers must be willing to work in what is, under the best of circumstances, a job characterized
by hard cases, high pressure, and low
60
status clients.1
E.C. 2-16"61 tacitly acknowledges that sub-professional pay may
sap the vigor of the attorneys' representation. ABA Informal Opinion 1236162 stated that "[i]n our opinion it is improper for a lawyer
to agree in advance that services rendered to members of a group
will be provided for fees less than those customarily being charged
.... 3 The Opinion cites as a rationale the findings that an attorney who participates in such an arrangement would incur a "substantial loss" financially or "not take the time required to perform
[the services] properly."'" 4 The first justification may reflect a paternalistic concern toward members of the legal fraternity. The second
rationalization relates to the possible experience of the underpaid Society staff attorney whose vigilance in providing quality representation may waiver due to demoralization resulting in part from poor
pay.
Under D.R. 2-106(B)(3), the reasonableness of legal fees is determined in part by "[t]he fee customarily charged in the locality for
similar legal services."' 65 By the fall of 1982, the salaries paid staff
attorneys of the Society, which had formerly been comparable to
those of Assistant District Attorneys employed in New York City,
had failed to keep pace. 166 Striking attorneys were therefore fulfilling
their obligation under the Code by fighting for adequate compensation to ensure competent representation in the provision of legal services to their clients.
X.

A PROSPECTIVE VIEW: THE ABA MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

A.

Old Wine in New Bottles?

Less than a decade had elapsed following the States' adoption
159.
160.
161.
its role in

Gersti, supra note 70, at 3; Freedman, supra note 61, at 2, col. 7.
See generally Pileggi, supra note 85.
EC 2-16 provides: "The legal profession cannot remain a viable force in fulfilling
our society unless its members receive adequate compensation for services rendered

." CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 44, at 374.

162. ABA Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1236
(1972) (referring to discounted legal services for members of a club).
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 44, at 413.
166. See supra note 152.
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of the Model Code when the ABA convened the Kutak Commission
to substantially revise the Code.167 Critics said the Code was poorly
drafted and difficult to apply."" The structure of the Code caused

confusion, as it was comprised of axioms, aspirational ideals, and
disciplinary standards."6 ' A seven-year effort to reform the rules of

legal ethics culminated in the ABA's decision in August 1983 to
abandon the Code altogether and instead endorse the Model
1 0

Rules.

The drafters of the Model Rules have endeavored to avoid the

confusion resulting from the Code's three-tiered structure. This
drafting modification has been widely heralded as a great improvement over the Code. Yet the Model Rules retain traces of the Code's

optional/mandatory dichotomy. The distinction in the Model Rules
lies in what the attorney "may" and "shall" do. "Shall" defines conduct that will form the basis of disciplinary action.171 "May" refers
to matters within the lawyer's discretion.1 72

The Model Rules have been criticized for containing conspicuous omissions.17 3 The drafters themselves acknowledge that not every
potential ethical problem the lawyer may encounter will be addressed in their proposed ethical guide.174 The large scale effort now
being mounted by the ABA 1 7 to urge adoption of the Model Rules

may be hampered as states carefully analyze the proposal and grap167. The reason given for revising the professional rules was to provide "clarification of
the ethical judgments lawyers must daily make in the practice of law." Abel, Why Does the
ABA Promulgate Ethical Rules?, 59 TEx. L. REV. 639, 641 (1981) (quoting MODEL RULES
Preface (Discussion Draft 1980)).
168. REPORTER. supra note 40, at 499-500.
169. Id.
[R]eliance on this three-part format has created considerable confusion about the
nature and the effect of the rules that govern the practice of law. . . . The ultimate
effect of this multiple and ambiguous function of the canons and ethical considerations is that the rules have little predictive value to the individual lawyer, and have
become an unreliable source of guidance to him or her.
Id. at 500 (Comments of Robert Kutak, Chairman of the Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards).
170. Flaherty, Ethics Fight: Round 2, Natl L.J., Jan. 16, 1984 at 1, col. 1.

171.

MODEL RULES

Scope, supra note 11.

172. Id.
173. Flaherty, supra note 170, at 11, col. 1-2.
174. MODEL RULES Preamble, supra note 11. The Preamble posits that the lawyer must
look beyond the black letter Rules to the spirit of the Rules. "Within the framework of these
Rules many difficult issues of professional discretion can arise. Such issues must be resolved
through the exercise of sensitive professional and moral judgment guided by the basic principles underlying the Rules." Id.
175. Flaherty, supra note 170, at 8, col. 3. "[I]n December [1983] the ABA created a
committee, known as the Special Committee on Implementation of the ABA Model Rules, to
help the states evaluate the rules and to advocate their adoption." Id.
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pie with perceived inadequacies.176 Adjustments in the proposed
Model Rules prior to their adoption by respective states may substantially reduce the uniformity of ethical standards in the
17 7
country.
One salient omission in the Model Rules is the failure to address strikes by lawyers of legal aid organizations. The discussion
that follows examines how its provisions would apply to a strike
under circumstances similar to the Society strike in October 1982.
Also, a modification of the Model Rules is proposed to apply to
strikes by staff attorneys of private defender organizations.
B. Competency of Representation
The Model Rules place preeminent emphasis on the competence
of attorneys in professional practice.178 Given this mandate, a strike
action to enforce ABA standards of competence on organizations
that employ lawyers to defend indigent clients is ethical. Model Rule
1.1 states in part: "A lawyer shall provide competent representation
to a client."' 7 9 The comment18 0 to the Rule makes it clear that no

exception or mitigation was intended to permit less competent service to be rendered to clients unable to afford private attorneys.18
The extent of lawyer preparation is measured in terms of thoroughness of investigation and completeness of legal analysis. 8 2 Rule 1.3
addresses the need for diligence in the attorney's conduct as an element of competence by stating that "[a] lawyer shall act with rea176. Id. at 8, col. 4. In most states, state bar committee reports are drafted, submitted
to the bar's board of governors or to its house of delegates, and eventually sent to the state
supreme court for approval. In New York, however, the Appellate Division, the intermediate
appeals court, must approve a new ethics code. Id.
177. Id. at 10, col. 1.
178. MODEL RULES Preamble, supra note 11.
179. The Rule continues: "Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill,
thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation." MODEL RULES,
Rule 1.1, supra note 11.
180. The Comments to the Rules are intended to elucidate the drafters' intent, but each
Rule's text is authoritative. MODEL RULES Scope, supra note 11.
181. The Comment to Rule 1.1 discusses the requisite knowledge and skill in a particular matter which a lawyer should possess prior to undertaking representation. In handling legal
problems of a type with which the lawyer is unfamiliar, it is not necessary that the lawyer have
prior experience or special training. All that the Rules require is that "the requisite level of
competence can be achieved by reasonable preparation. This applies as well to a lawyer who is
appointed as counsel for an unrepresented person." MODEL RULES Rule 1.1 comment, supra
note 11.
182. The comment to Rule 1.1 further explains: "Competent handling of a particular
matter includes inquiry into and analysis of the factual and legal elements of the problem, and
the use of methods and procedures meeting the standards of competent practitioners. It also
includes adequate preparation." Id.
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sonable diligence and promptness in representing a client.'

83

Inadequate client representation brought about by the pressures
of an unmanageable caseload will result in violations of Rules 1.1
and 1.3. As the comment to 1.3 explains: "A lawyer's workload
should be controlled so that each matter can be handled ade-

quately."184 A staff attorney of a legal aid organization who spends
time adequately preparing, investigating, and analyzing the cases of
some court-appointed clients at the expense of others might be in
danger of violating Mode Rule 1.7(b), 85 which addresses conflicts of

interest. Competing responsibilities which limit representation of one
or more clients violates the principle of loyalty to all.' 86
C. Responsibilities of Supervisory Staff

Unlike the Code, the Model Rules impose responsibility on supervisory personnel to actively monitor adherence to ethical practice

by their subordinates. Supervisors in a legal aid office who knowingly
overlook an ethical conflict will violate Rule 5.1(b),' 87 which codifies
this duty. Under 5.1(c)(1) and (2),188 supervisory personnel would
violate the Model Rules themselves where they knowingly en-

couraged or ordered staff attorneys to continue to work with unmanageable caseloads, thereby courting violation of Rules 1.1, 1.3, and
1.7(b).
Under the Model Rules, a supervisor is vicariously liable for a
subordinate's violation of the Code if he knows of the act in time to
avoid its effects but does not rectify the problem. 189 This additional
accountability is an improvement over the Code in strengthening attorneys' self-regulation of their profession. Had this provision been in
183. MODEL RULES Rule 1.3, supra note 11.
184. MODEL RULES Rule 1.3, supra note 11. comment.
185. The Rule provides: A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of
that client may be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client ....
MODEL RULES, Rule 1.7(b), supra note 11.
186. Id. Rule 1.7(b) comment.
187. MODEL RULES Rule 5.1(b). "A lawyer having direct supervisory authority over
another lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the other lawyer conforms to the
Rules of Professional Conduct." MODEL RULES, supra note 11.
188. MODEL RULES Rule 5.1(c), supra note 11.
A lawyer shall be responsible for another lawyer's violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct if: (1) the lawyer orders or, with knowledge of the specific conduct,
ratifies the conduct involved; or (2) the lawyer is a partner in the law firm in which
the other lawyer practices, or has direct supervisory authority over the other lawyer,
and knows of the conduct at a time when its consequences can be avoided or mitigated but fails to take reasonable remedial action.
189.

Id.
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effect immediately prior to the 1982 strike, Society management
might have been more responsive to the claims of staff attorneys that
they were being asked to represent clients in a manner that fell below the ethical minimum level of competency.
Compounding speculation about how the Model Rules would
apply to a strike is an ambiguity contained within the Rules: May a
staff attorney knowingly provide less than competent client representation because a supervisor pressures her to continue to work with an
unmanageable caseload? Rule 5.2(b) provides that "[a] subordinate
lawyer does not violate the Rules of Professional Conduct if that
lawyer acts in accordance with a supervisory lawyer's reasonable resolution of an arguable question of professional duty."190 In the context of a legal aid organization, this provision contemplates a disagreement between staff and supervisors about how inadequate client
representation must become before Rule 1.1 is violated.
The possibility remains that a subordinate who is convinced that
continued client representation will result in incompetent lawyering
may nonetheless choose to "hide" under the cloak of authority of the
supervisor's judgment to the contrary. Rule 5.2(b) substantially undermines any effect of the Model Rules to pressure the staff
subordinate to "blow the whistle" when the supervisory attorney is
willing to supercede certain ethical considerations with "more pressing" budgetary concerns.
The ambiguity in the Rules is heightened by Rule 5.2(a) which
states that a subordinate "is bound by the Rules of Professional Conduct notwithstanding that the lawyer acted at the direction of another person." 191 In the absence of an authoritative court ruling or
an advisory committee ethical opinion clarifying this point, the
subordinate's assessment that an ethical violation is occurring leaves
him susceptible to disciplinary action. The staff attorney is vulnerable even in the face of assurances to the contrary offered by a supervising attorney who may be motivated by political and budgetary
considerations.
The staff attorney of a legal aid society who finds himself in a
dilemma under Rule 5.2 may ethically decide to strike to pressure
supervisory personnel to take corrective action. Rule 8.4(d) makes it
professional misconduct for a lawyer to "engage in conduct that is
prejudicial to the administration of justice."19 2 Where indigent cli190. MODEL RULES Rule 5.2(b), supra note 11.
191.
192.

MODEL RULES Rule 5.2(a), supra note 11.
The comment to Rule 8.4(d) observes: "A pattern of repeated offenses, even ones of

minor significance when considered separately, can indicate indifference to legal obligation."
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ents are not being accorded their right to competent representation,
knowing failure of a subordinate attorney to rectify the situation will
constitute a violation of Rule 8.4(d). Where a consensus among staff
attorneys develops that a violation of Rule 8.4(d) is occurring, the
extreme act of a strike may be justified if less extreme measures are
ineffective.
D. Financial Considerations
The impact of low salaries on the adequacy of representation
due to low staff morale, high rates of turnover of experienced litigators, and its inhibiting effect on the recruitment of new legal talent, has been noted.193 The Model Rules contain provisions similar to
the Code regarding the need for sufficient compensation for legal
representation. Under Rule 1.5(a)(3), the attorney may refer to "the
fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services"194
as an indication of what constitutes reasonable compensation. In a
situation like that of Society staff attorneys in October 1982, some
action to force salary scale revision is appropriate under the Model
Rules. The effect of sub-standard salaries on the competency of representation is recognized in the Comment to Rule 1.5.1"
E. Provisionsfor Attorney Withdrawal
Provisions for withdrawal under the Model Rules are inadequate to address the issue of a strike by staff attorneys of a legal aid
organization. The Model Rules indicate that where a matter is pending before a tribunal, the permission of the court to withdraw is usually required.196 As posited,1 97 where the organization is the counsel
of record, the individual attorney has no standing to gain permission
from the court to withdraw in the event of a strike against his employer. The factual scenario anticipated by the Model Rules that
would justify a requirement for court permission to withdraw substantially differs from a strike against an employer legal services organization to compel it to provide competent legal representation.
Model Rule 1.16(c) 198 applies where a defendant in criminal
MODEL RULES Rule 8.4(d), supra note 11.
193. See supra notes 155-60 and accompanying text.
194. MODEL RULES Rule 1.5(a)(3), supra note 11.
195. In referring to the arrangement of terms of payment the comment states: "An
agreement may not . . . induce the lawyer improperly to curtail services for the client or
perform them in a way contrary to the client's interest." MODEL RULES Rule 1.5, supra note
11.
196. MODEL RULES Rule 1.16 comment, supra note 11.
197. See supra notes 117-125 and accompanying text.
198. "When ordered to do so by a tribunal, a lawyer shall continue representation not-
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court is urging the counsel of record to violate an ethical rule in the
client's defense effort. The attorney instead may wish to withdraw.
By so doing, however, the client's legitimate defense will be
prejudiced. Rule 1.16(c) requires that in this situation, the attorney
cannot withdraw without the court's permission.19 9 This requirement
should not apply where, as in the 1982 strike, Society staff attorneys
attempt to redress legitimate grievances through striking. In such a
strike, where adequate notice is given pursuant to Rule 1.16(d), 00
the client is protected from prejudice because a supervising attorney
will step in or the court will appoint private practitioners to assume
representation of cases assigned to striking attorneys. The Model
Rules should be revised to distinguish between attorney withdrawal
as the draft presently views it and the right of attorney-employees of
legal aid corporations to strike against their employer over salary
and caseload size.
F. Proposed Modification to Model Rule 1.16
To reconcile language in the proposed Model Rules with the
right of attorney-employees of legal service corporations to strike,
the following language should be added to Rule 1.16:
(e) Paragraph (c) does not apply to strikes by attorney-employees
against their employer when ten business days' advance notice of
the strike is given to the employer and to the court. In the event of
such a strike, supervisory attorneys shall assume client representation of newly assigned cases and all cases previously assigned to
striking attorneys. In the case of a strike by staff attorneys of a
legal service corporation, private practitioners shall assume client
representation as appointed by the court. Such court appointed representation shall continue throughout the duration of the strike.
Amendment of the Model Rules is necessary to recognize the
attorney-employees' right to strike against their employer whether it
be a legal service corporation, a private firm, or a corporation. Further, attorney-employees must be given the right to notify the court
directly when client representation falls below minimum standards of
competence. The responsibility placed on individual staff attorneys
withstanding good cause for terminating the representation." MODEL RULES, Rules llb(c),

supra note 11.
199. Id. Rule 1.16(c) comment, supra note 11.
200. "Upon termination of representation, a lawyer shall take steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a client's interests, such as giving reasonable notice to the client,
allowing time for employment of other counsel .
MODEL RULES Rule 1.16 (d), supra
note 11.
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under the Model Rules of Professional Ethics to ensure that competent representation is provided to clients need not be inconsistent
with the right codified in the Act to bargain collectively over terms
and conditions of employment. The proposed amendment to Model
Rule 1.16 would codify these two principles.
To facilitate uninterrupted client representation and minimize
disruption to the courts, advance notification of the intent to strike
should be required. A specified period of time for notice to the employer and court prior to the strike is preferable to a vague, hard-toenforce requirement of "adequate" notice. An analogy to provisions
contained in the Act to minimize the disruptive effects of a strike by
employees in the health care industry is appropriate.
Striking health care workers are required to give ten days advance notice to their employer prior to walking off their jobs.20 1 A
similar requirement for strikes by attorney-employees should not be
viewed as too great an encroachment on this ability to wage an effective strike where the quality of client representation is at issue. By
giving the employer and the courts an indication of the serious nature of their grievance, corrective action may be achieved prior to
the strike. Thus, disruption of the smooth functioning of the judicial
system may be avoided.
XI. CONCLUSION
A goal of any code of professional ethics must be to preserve the
standards of competent practice without infringing on the organizational rights of professional employees. The interest of the American
Bar Association in maintaining the attorneys' dignity may, for some,
weigh against acknowledging the rights of attorney-employees to
strike. Such overprotectiveness, however, must give way to a recognition of the protections accorded employees by the Act. When legal
representation provided by a private legal services corporation is on
the verge of falling below minimum practice standards, as was the
case in New York City in the Fall of 1982, staff attorneys should be
encouraged to police themselves and, when other measures fail, be
permitted to impose accepted standards of competence on the offend201.

Section 8(g) of the Act provides:

A labor organization before engaging in any strike, picketing, or other concerted
refusal to work at any health care institution shall, not less than ten days prior to
such action, notify the institution in writing and the Federal Mediation and ConcilIation Service of that intention . . . . The notice shall state the date and time that
such action will commence. The notice, once given, may be extended by the written
agreement of both parties.

29 U.S.C. § 158(g).
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ing organization through a strike. By requiring notice of a strike to
the employer and providing a "cooling off" period the concomitant
disruption of the court system may be avoided. Achieving such a
balance of competing interests represents lawyer self-governance at
its finest.
Randy Lee Arthur
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